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jeopardy; that in attempting to protect a client's interests by recording a notice
of pendency, the attorney runs the risk of personal liability in an action for
slander of title.
There seems to be no controlling authority in New York. A notice of
pendency may be filed where the action affects the title to, or the possession, use
or enjoyment of, real property. N. Y. Cirv. PRAc. ACT §§ 120-125. In Smith v.
Smith, 26 Hun. 573 (1880), an action on the case for abuse of the civil process
by defendant's filing a notice of pendency, there is a dictum that such a filing is
privileged; but in Schierloh v. Kelly, 253 App. Div. 373, 2 N. Y. S. 2d 188
(2d Dep't, 1938), the court refused to dismiss a complaint where the basis of
the action was the malicious filing of lis pendens, although the question of
privilege was not considered. The absolute privilege was granted to the printer
of a defamatory list of questions which counsel prepared for trial, Youmans v.
Smith, supra, while the court refused to extend such a privilege to the writer of a
complaint to the District Attorney, Pecua v. West, 233 N. Y. 316, 135 N. E. 515
(1922). The Law Revision Commission has recently recommended that the
legislature require parties filing a lis pendens to post a bond. N. Y. LAW REV.
COMm. 203-226 (1951). It is uncertain, then, whether the filing of lis pendens
in New York would be in the course of a judicial proceeding and therefore
absolutely privileged.
The absolute privilege is granted to insure the utmost freedom of expression
during litigation, and to afford access to the courts without fear of personal
liability in a defemation suit. RESTAiEMENT, TORTS § 587, comment a (1938).
The court's supervisory and contempt powers are felt to be an adequate check to
potential abuses. Maginn v. Schmick, 127 Mo. App. 411, 105 S. W. 666 (1907).
In view of this purpose, the decision in the instant case appears to be sound.
The recorder of lis pendens is able to publish the object of his action in a place
of public access, while the courts have little, if any, control over such publication.
The parties recording such a notice are protected if this act is in good faith and
without malice, and any risk of personal liability is outweighed by the necessity
of preserving the enjoyment of property interests in the face of malicious claims.
Richard F. Griffin
Taxations: Marital Deduction foo Life Estates
Under the terms of her husband's will ,the surviving spouse was given a life
estate with uncontrolled discretion to use, enjoy, sell or dispose of the income and
principal but with no power over the disposition of any part remaining at her
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death. An absolute devise over to remaindermen was made of the portion, if any,
remaining at the termination of the life estate. Held: The marital deduction should
be disallowed since the wife's estate was terminable and therefore did not qualify
under section 812 (e) of the 1939 Code (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §2056);
Estate of Edward F. Pipe v. Commissioner, 23 T. C. No. 14 (Oct. 22, 1954).
The marital deduction excludes bequests to the surviving spouse from the
gross estate of decedent in an amount not in excess of 50 per cent of the gross
estate in order to reconcile basic differences which exist between common law and
community property states. This new concept, and particularly the terminable
interest rules, did not receive the weighty consideration given to income-splitting
provisions in the Internal Revenue Act of 1948 and have created a persisting
area of confusion.
Within the past two years the Tax Court has considered the interpretation
of these provisions several times, the principal case having the greatest breadth.
Where decedent left his residuary estate to his surviving spouse for life, remainders
over to his children, the Tax Court held the interest was terminable and no
marital deduction would be allowed, despite the wife's power to invade and deplete
corpus to maintain her standard of living. Estate of Michael Melamid v. Commis-
sionr, 22 T. C. No. 116 (July 23, 1954). Two monhs later the Court held that
no part of a transfer in trust qualified for a marital deduction when decedents
surviving spouse was entitled to life income from the corpus with a general
power to appoint two-thirds of the corpus by will. The Court would accept no
less than the power to appoint the entire corpus, free of the trust. Esate of Louis
B. Hoffenberg v. Commissioner, 22 T. C. No. 146 (Sept. 17, 1954). A similar
conclusion was reached the next month on the grounds that the section as written
required complete power to appoint, although the widow had already appointed
one-half of the corpus. Estate of Harrison P. Shedd v. Commissioner, 23 T. C.
No. 8.
In the instant, case, the petitioner contended in the alternative, first, that the
estate taken by the wife, was, in reality, a fee; second, that the will created an
implied trust of which the wife was trustee and life beneficiary, with remainders
over but with an unqualified power over the corpus for enjoyment and consumption
as well as for disposition.
The Court disposed of the first contention, saying that New York had modified
the Rule in Shelley's Case so that an absolute power of disposition, not accom-
panied by a trust, given for life, creates a fee absolute as to creditors, purchasers
and incumbrancers, but limited by future estates. Terry v. Wiggins, 47 N. Y. 512
(1872).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
With respect-to the implied trust argument, the Court said first, that no
such trust existed, despite loose references in some New York cases to "trustees";
second, that even if such a trust existed, the corpus therefor would not only be less
than the total share left to the widow, but also would be so indefinite as to render
impossible of identification at the decedents death what property was subject to
the trust and therefore intended to be covered by the section.
Under the 1954 Code, section 2056 (b) (5), the problem in the principal
case is covered explicitly and the marital deduction is allowed when the surviving
spouse is given an uncontrolled power of invasion of corpus, exercisable either
by will or during life. This is true of a life estate, as well as of a formal trust. No
provision was added to make section 2056 retroactive, however, and the Courts
therefore have given it a prospective effect only, applying the 1954 Code, section
812 (e) to all decedents dying prior to December 17, 1954, the effective date of
the 1954 Code provision. The possibility that section 2056 might be viewed as a
clarification, rather than a modification of existent law, and therefore that its
rationale would be applied retroactively was denied unequivocally by the Tax
Court in Estate of Harrison P. Shedd v. Commissioner, sqpra.
In the absence of positive Congressional action to remedy this situation, it is
highly dubious that the trend of decisions, illustrated by the principal case and the
cases: preceding, will change. The possibility of receiving the marital deduction
for estates of this character is slight unless the estate can be placed exactly within
the narrow precise terms of the 1939 Code.
Richard G. Birmingham
Workmen's Compensation: Bar to an Action in Deceit
Employee, injured in the scope of his employment, failed to report his
injury to the Industrial Commission, relying on his employer's promise to do so.
Employer failed to make the report but paid weekly compensation to employee
for two years. When employer then stopped payments, the Industrial Commission
refised employee's subsequent application for workmen's compensation on the
grounds that the application was barred by the two year statute of limitations,
during which time either an application or notice of injury must be filed under
Ohio law, employee brought an action in deceit against his employer. Held:
Employer's compliance with the Workmen's Compensation law bars any other
action for damages for injuries arising in the scope of employment. Greenwalt v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., - 0. S. - , 128 N. E. 2d 116 (1955).
In general, the Workmen's Compensation statute excludes all other remedies
